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Abstract 
There has been a very large amount of research devoted to the study of chains of 
activities.  The  initial  studies  were  developed  in  geography  (space  and  time 
description  of  human  activity,  as  described  by  Torsten  Hägerstrand  and  Peter 
Hagget) and in economics (starting with the seminal work of Gary Becker). More 
recently, transportation scholars (see for example the studies of Chandra Bhat or of 
Kay  Axhausen)  have  started  to  develop  sophisticated  econometric  models  to 
describe  the  chain  of  activities  during  the  whole  day,  or  the  whole  week.  One 
rationale for this research is the fact that users are increasingly sophisticated and 
spend more and more time on trips other than from home to work. Thus, lengthy 
trips with many stops can now be envisaged (with sometimes one of these stops 
being at the office) which change the structure of travel demand. 
We  propose  here  a  complementary  avenue  of  research  covering  the  following 
questions: what are the impacts of the chain of activities on the decisions of the 
firm? The fact that users change their activity patterns does influence the locations 
of the firms (see for example the emergence of large shopping areas near railway 
stations  or  even  inside  railway  stations  and  airports),  as  well  as  their  pricing 
strategies.  The  questions  are:  Is  the  market  more  or  less  competitive  when  trip 
chaining is taken into account? Are human activities more or less concentrated as 
users are more involved in trip chaining? 
Keywords: trip  chaining,  discrete  choice  model,  general  equilibrium  model, 
imperfect competition, wage competition.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
There  has  been  a  considerable  amount  of  research  devoted  to  the  study  of  activity 
patterns.  The  initial  studies  were  developed  in  geography  with  the  space-time 
description  of  human  activity  advanced  by  Hägerstrand  (1970,  1975)  and  Haggett 
(1977) and in economics (starting with the seminal work of Gary Becker (1987). More 
recently,  transportation  scholars  have  started  to  develop  sophisticated  econometric 
models to describe the chain of activities during the whole day of individuals using 
diary survey data (e.g. Axhausen (2002)). Adler and Ben-Akiva (1979) present a model 
for a day non-work travel pattern. Bowman and Ben-Akiva (2001) include work as an 
activity in their discrete choice model system, which can be used for travel forecasting. 
Bhat and Singh (2000) develop a representation of the workday activity-travel pattern, 
in which several activity stops can be made during different periods of the day (sub-
patterns). Golob (2000) develops and tests a household trip generation model, which 
forecasts activity participation, trip chaining and travel time as a function of household 
characteristics  and  accessibility  indices.  Kuppam  and  Pendyala  (2001)  also  use  a 
structural equations modelling approach  applied to activity based travel survey data 
collected in Washington DC. Bhat et al (2004) focus on multiday activity generation. 
Trip  chaining  is  considered  to  be  a  growing  phenomenon  in  travel  and  activity 
behaviour, as individuals try to reduce the amount of travel time needed to complete 
daily activities, given the limitations of their time budget. In their empirical analysis 
using data from  US metropolitan areas,  Bhat and Singh  (2000) show  that stops for 
shopping or socio-recreational activities are most likely to be made during the evening 
commute or later in the evening. Recker et al (2001) examine the effect that efficient 
travel decisions, like trip chaining, can have on the potential to engage in additional 
activities.  Applying  their  numerical  model,  in  which  a  generalised  household  cost 
function  is  minimised  subject  to  time-related  and  routing  constraints,  to  data  from 
Portland, Oregon, they show potential household accessibility improvements with trip 
chaining. Hensher and Reyes (2000) use econometric analysis to look at the potential 
barrier trip-chaining creates to attracting car users to switch to public transport. In the 
field  of  consumer  research,  Brooks  et  al  (2004)  apply  diminishing  sensitivity  and 
reference  point  dependence  theory  to  trip  chaining  and  investigate  experimentally 
preferences for distance and clustering of stops in the activity chain.  
In this paper we pursue a different avenue of research and examine the effect that trip 
chaining by households has on the pricing and wage decisions of firms. Are firms more 
or less competitive? Our starting point is a theoretical, symmetric model of a city, in 
which households live in the city centre and there is imperfect competition between 
firms  located  in  subcentres  (de  Palma  and  Proost  2005).  In  the  original  model 
individuals made separate working and shopping trips. Here we relax this assumption 
and allow consumers  to shop at the subcentre where they work.  The model is first 
briefly described in Section 2 and the short-run equilibrium with trip chaining is then Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      3 
derived and compared to the results of the original model. A small numerical illustration 
is included. In Section 3 we look at the welfare implications of trip chaining and in 
Section 4 conclude.  
2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1.  Model Setting 
The study imperfect competition in a city both with and without congestion has been 
analysed recently for a closed economy by de Palma and Proost (2005). In their model, 
households are constrained to make separate trips for shopping and working, so trip-
chaining is de facto not permitted. In this paper we relax this assumption and allow 
residents  to  shop  at  their  work  location  without  making  a  separate  journey.  In  the 
current paper, the model set-up is symmetric and we do not include congestion in order 
to focus solely on the effect trip-chaining has on the price equilibrium. In this section 
we provide a brief description of the model set-up and derive the relevant expressions 
for the symmetric price equilibrium without congestion but with trip chaining. 
Residents live in a city centre and travel to one of n subcentres to work and shop. In the 
symmetric city, the subcentres are equidistant from the centre and there are at least two 
subcentres. Residents first choose where to work and then decide whether to shop at 
their work location or at another subcentre; however residents can only travel between 
the  centre  and  each  subcentre  and  not  between  subcentres  (see  Figure  2-1).  A 
homogeneous good is produced in the city centre and used as an intermediate input for 
the  differentiated  good,  which  is  produced  in  the  subcentres.  Thus,  both  firms  and 
consumers  incur  travel  costs.  In  this  general  equilibrium  setting,  the  numéraire 
homogeneous  good  represents  all  production  in  the  economy  other  than  the 
differentiated good and all profits are returned to the households. The labour market is 
also considered separately and jobs in the differentiated industry are heterogeneous. 
Only one differentiated product variant is produced at each subcentre by a single firm 
and each household will consume one unit of differentiated good and supply one unit of 
labour  for  its  production.  Hence,  in  the  current  formulation,  demand  for  the 
differentiated good is inelastic and, if the labour market is assumed to be fully flexible, 
the  product  and  labour  markets  will  clear.  All  remaining  labour  (θ)  and  income  is 
devoted  to  the  homogeneous  good  and  there  is  therefore  no  possibility  of  non-
consumption or unemployment.  
The total production possibilities of an economy with N households and n firms can 









N D c D nF t D nK G q a a a
=
+ = + + + + + + + ∑ ,  (1) 
where  ( ) i D D =∑  is the total demand for the differentiated good, 
1 c is the marginal 
production cost of the intermediate input,  F is the fixed production cost for each firm 








t D a a a
=
+ + ∑ . These last are exogenous since there is no congestion. Each Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      4 
subcentre requires some road infrastructure (K ), which is paid for by a levy (S) on 
firms and head-tax (T) on consumers. Finally, G denotes residual consumption of the 























Figure 2-1  Schematic of city layout 
2.2.  Household Preferences 
Household  utility  is  represented  by  a  linear  function  of  the  utility  obtained  from 
consumption  of  the  differentiated  and  homogeneous  goods  and  the  disutility  of 
supplying labour to the production of these goods. Using the household budget equation 
to substitute for consumption of the homogeneous good, an indirect conditional utility 
function  can  be  derived  to  express  household  preferences.  In  this  case  the  utility 
function represents the preferences of a household that buys differentiated good k and 
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Each of the N households is paid a wage, i w , for working at subcentre i and buys one 
unit of variant k at price,  k p . Both prices and wages will be determined by the model. 
The  parameters 
w a   and 
d a   represent,  respectively,  the  number  of  commuting  and 
shopping  trips  the  consumer
1  undertakes  per  unit  of  production  (respectively 
consumption) of the differentiated good. They are positive constants. The travel time 
required for shopping activities,  k t , is zero if there is trip-chaining. Otherwise, in the 
symmetric  case,  commuting  and  shopping  travel  times  are  identical  and  positive 
( 0 k i t t t = = > ). Each household also receives a share of the firms’ profits (π). 
The utility of consumption of differentiated product variant k is given by an intrinsic 
quality component  k h and a stochastic component:
d
k m e : 
 
d
k k h h m e = + % ,  (3) 
                                                       
1 In the following we will use household and consumer interchangeably as it is easier to consider the 
household as a single worker or shopper. Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      5 




i i b b m e = - % .  (4) 
Hence, all households will value the quality of all product variants in the same way and 
will  experience  the  same  disinclination  to  work  at  all  subcentres.  However,  the 
households will still vary in their tastes: the parameters  i e and  k e represent the intrinsic 
heterogeneity  of  consumer  tastes  and  are  assumed  to  be  i.i.d.  double  exponentially 
distributed.  The  parameters 
w m and
d m determine  the  degree  of  heterogeneity  of 
preferences.  In  order  to  apply  the  nested  logit  approach,  consistency  implies  that: 
0
d w m m < £ , so that households’ preferences for their choice of workplace are at least 
as strong as their preferences for shopping location. 
Substitution  of  (3)  and  (4)  in  the  utility  formulation  (2)  results in  a  random  utility 
function for which the choice probabilities can be determined using the nested logit 
model. We use a heuristic approach to derive the probabilities of working and shopping 
at a given subcentre: the resident first selects his workplace and then chooses where to 
shop. The consumer surplus associated with the resident’s shopping alternatives, given 
his work location, affects his initial workplace choice. A full derivation of the choice 
probabilities can be obtained using the Generalised Extreme Value (GEV) approach of 
McFadden (Mc Fadden 1978). The decision tree for the nested logit is shown in Figure 
2-2 below.  
 
Figure 2-2 Nested logit 
In order to derive the symmetric price equilibrium, we first suppose that firm 1 deviates 
and sets price  1 p for its product and pays its workers a wage 1 w . All other firms charge 
p* and pay w*. 
The probability of working at subcentre 1 is given by a binary nested logit model, as 
follows: 
1  2  n 
1 2  n 
Choice of work place 
Choice of shopping 
location 
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,  (5) 
where CS1 is the consumer surplus for a resident who works at subcentre 1  
 
1 *




d CS h e n e
a
m m m
- - -  
  = + + -
   
.    (6) 
The first term in the bracket refers to the resident who shops and works at subcentre 1 
(trip chains), while the second term refers to the resident who works at subcentre 1 but 
shops elsewhere with travel time t. 
CS-1 is the consumer surplus for a resident who works at any other subcentre k, say 
 
1 * *
1 log ( 2)
d d
d d d
p t p p t
d CS h e e n e
a a
m m m m
- - - - -
-
 
  = + + + -
   
.  (7) 
The first term in the bracket refers to the resident who works at k and shops at subcentre 
1, the second term to the resident who trip chains (works and shops at k) and the third 
term to the resident who works at k and shops at subcentre  1 j k or ¹ , with travel time 
t. 
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+ -
.  (8) 
The denominator is the same as in (5) since the consumer still has the same chance of 
working at subcentre 1 and being paid  1 w  or another subcentre and being paid w*. 
























.  (9) 
The first term of the denominator refers to a resident who trip chains and the second to 
the resident who works at subcentre 1 but shops elsewhere. 
The probability of a resident shopping at subcentre 1, given he does not work there is 
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- - - - -
+ + -
.  (10) 
In this case the terms in the denominator cover the options of: a)shopping at subcentre 1 
but  working  elsewhere  so  there  is  a  travel time;  b)  shopping  and  working  at  some 
subcentre ( 1 k ¹ say); and c) shopping at k but working at subcentre ( 1 j k or ¹ ), so 
again there is a travel component. The resident has to travel to subcentre 1, so t appears 
in the numerator. Note that in the above equations the h and β terms cancel. 
Let  1 1
w w N NP = , the proportion of households  that work at subcentre 1. Then we can 
write the probability of shopping at subcentre 1 as 
  1 1 1|1 1 1| 1 (1 )
s w s w s N N P N P P - = + - .  (11) 
We also know from market clearing that  1 1
w s N N = and by substitution in (11) we get 
  1 1|1 1| 1 1| 1 1 0
w s s s P P P P - -   - + - =   ,  (12) 
which provides a relation between the price  1 p and wage  1 w set by firm 1. 
2.3.  Firms 
In general, the profit of firm i can be written: 
 
1 ( , ) ( ) ( ) 1... ,
h w
i i i i w p p w c t NP F S i n p a = - - - - + " =   (13) 
where  the  demand 
d w
i i i D NP NP = = under  market  clearing  conditions.  Since  firm  1 
deviates, his profit becomes 
 
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 ( , *, , *) ( ) ( )
h w w w p p p w c t NP F S p a = - - - - + .  (14) 
Firms compete in a non-cooperative Nash game with their own prices and wages as the 
strategic variables. Since from (12) we know that  1 p determines  1 w  and vice versa, we 
take  the  wage  as  the  strategic  variable  for  firm  1  and  write 1 1 1 ( ) p g w = .  Note 
that: 1 1 1 ( ) ( , *, *) g w g w w p = .  Then,  further  assuming  that  firm  1  takes  the  prices  and 
wages of the other firms as given, the first order condition for profit maximisation by 
this firm is given by 
  ( )














      -
= - + - - - =      
       
.  (15) 
In the next subsection, we derive an expression for the key strategic term dg1/dw1.  
2.4.  Market equilibrium 
In  order  to  derive  an  expression  for  a  candidate  Nash  equilibrium  from  the  profit 
maximisation  condition  and  prove  its  existence,  we  first  need  to  determine  the Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      8 
derivative of the price at firm 1 with respect to its wage ( 1 1 dg dw  in equation (15)).  I 
added in a few place inequalities inside the equations.  


















º £  and  1|1 1| 1
s s P P - F º - > 0. 
Lemma 1 is proved in the Appendix. 
 
Substitution of  1 1 dg dw from Lemma 1 in (15) leads to 
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- + - - - =       + - F      
  (16) 
Replacing  1
w P  in (16) in terms of the conditional shopping probabilities ( 1|1
s P and 1| 1
s P - ) 
from equation (12), we obtain 
  ( ) [ ] [ ]
1|1 1| 1 1
1 1
1 (1 ) (1 )
0
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.  (17) 
Now, at equilibrium in the symmetric case,  1 * p p = and we can therefore rewrite the 
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,  (19) 
where  ( )
/ 0 0,1
d d t e
a m l
- º > Î from our model assumptions. Moreover, we can write 
  1|1 1| 1
1
1 ( 1)






F = - =
+ -
.  (20) 
Note,  0 F > so  there  is  a  greater  probability  of  trip  chaining  than  of  working  and 
shopping in separate locations. 1|1
s P is also increasing with  l :large travel costs or weak 
preference  for  shopping  location  increase  the  probability  of  trip  chaining.  There  is, 
however, an equal probability of working at any of the firms ( 1 1
w P n = ). Substitution of 
expressions  (18),  (19)  and  (20)  in  (17)  allow  us  to  specify  the  candidate  Nash 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 1   When trip chaining is permitted, there exists a unique symmetric Nash 
equilibrium in prices and wages, for two firms or more in the market. The price-wage 
equilibrium is given by 
  ( )
[ ]
1 (1 ) 1
* * ( )
1 1 2 ( 2)
d
h w d n n





  - -   - = + + + -  
- - - + - +    
.  (21) 
Proposition 1 is proved in the Appendix.  Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      9 
From (13), in equilibrium, a firm’s gross profit per household (neglecting fixed costs) is 
  ( )
( )
(1 ) 1 ( )
*
1 1 2 ( 2)
w d d
n n n
m l m m m
p
m l ml
  - - +
= -  
- - - + - +    
.  (22) 
Using the fact that  1 m <  and  1 l < , it can be verified that  * 0 p > . The comparative 
statics  result  is  straightforward  and  left  to  the reader.  The  relationship  between  the 
mark-up  in  price  over  wage  and  profit  and  the  parameters  , , , ,
d w d n t a m m and  l is 
discussed in Section 4 using a numerical example. 
It is possible to perform the same analysis, within the nested logit framework, for the 
case where consumers have to work and shop at different subcentres (i.e. perform single 
purpose  trips).  In  this  case 1|1 1| 1 1 1 1
s s s w P P P P n - = = = =   and  the  symmetric  Nash 
equilibrium in prices and wages is given by 
  ( )





p w c t
n
a m m - = + + +
-
  (23) 
This is in fact the same as the equilibrium which can be derived when working and 
shopping decisions are taken independently (see de Palma and Proost 2005), with the 
restriction 
d w m m £ for the nested logit approach (Anderson et al 1992). In this case 
profits only depend on the consumer heterogeneity parameters and number of firms. 
We  can  now  compare  the  symmetric  trip  chaining  equilibrium  with  the  above 
symmetric, reference equilibrium.  
Proposition 2   The symmetric firm mark-up when households can trip chain cannot 
exceed the mark-up when households can only perform single purpose trips. The mark-
ups are in fact equal when 
d w m m =  
Proof 
Using (23), (21) can be rewritten as 
  ( ) ( )
( )
1 (1 )
* * * *








  - -
- = - -  
- - + - +    
.  (24) 
The difference in the mark-up between the two equilibria depends on the sign of the 
second term on the right hand side of (24). The terms outside the parentheses are non-
negative for  2 n ³  (at least two firms are considered in the model) since 
d w m m m º  is 
less than or equal to one:  0
d w m m < £ is a requirement of nested logit model. For the 
terms inside the parentheses, the numerator is positive as t, 
d a and 
d m are all positive by 
definition and the denominator is also positive for 2 n ³ . Hence the last term in (24) is 
always non-positive and the mark-up with trip chaining is at most equal to the mark-up 
without trip chaining. Q.E.D. 
The intuition is that the demand curve for shoppers with trip chaining is flatter than the 
corresponding  demand  curve  when  households  cannot  shop  and  work  at  the  same 
subcentre.  In  equilibrium,  a  firm  sells  its  product  to  a  larger  number  of  its  own 
workforce than to consumers who work at other subcentres. Thus, a decrease in the Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      10 
price  by  one  firm  would  attract  additional  non-trip  chaining  customers  from  other 
subcentres, while retaining the customers who already work for the firm. Hence, when 
trip-chaining is possible, a change in price would lead to a greater change in demand 
compared with the case without trip chaining and as a consequence, the equilibrium 
price with trip chaining is higher than without trip chaining. In a sense, trip chaining 
decreases  the  spatial  market  power  of  each  firm,  and  therefore  increases 
competitiveness and therefore decreases equilibrium prices and equilibrium profit (since 
market demand is inelastic).  
3.  WELFARE ANALYSIS 
Proposition 3    In the symmetric equilibrium, the consumer surplus
2 when households 
can trip chain is larger than the consumer surplus when households must perform only 
single purpose trips. The difference in consumer surplus is given by 
 
1 1
( * *) log 1
d




-   -
- = - + +  
 
.  (25) 
Proposition 3 is proved in the Appendix. Consumer surplus depends on price, rather 
than price minus wage. The price difference in (25) can be obtained from Proposition 2 
by setting the wage equal to one (without loss of generality).  
Although consumer surplus increases, firms’ profits are smaller when households trip 
chain, compared with the reference equilibrium, as the price mark-up they can charge 
above  the  wages  they  pay  is  reduced.  However,  this  negative  effect  is  more  than 
compensated for by the increase in consumer surplus, since the difference in prices are 
just transfers between households and firms. 
Proposition 4   In the symmetric equilibrium, welfare
2 is greater when households can 
trip chain, than when they have to perform only single purpose trips.  The difference in 









-   -
- = +  
 
.  (26) 
Proposition 4 is proved in the Appendix. 
When consumers are able to trip chain there is both a direct benefit to society from the 
reduced travel cost and an additional cost due to the reduction in consumer variety. 
Since each consumer trip chains with probability 1|1 1
s P n > , the term 
dt n a  represents 
the lower bound for the reduction in travel cost. This can be obtained from (26) by 
setting 
1 1 l e
- = +  where  1,
d d t e a m = << for small travel times t. Then, the welfare 
saving 
( ) ( )




W W O O
n n n
a e e
m m e e   - = + = + = +    
 
                                                       
2 Consumer surplus and Welfare are calculated per household Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      11 
is approximately equal to the average travel time saving since  1|1 1 0.
s P n if l » » . More 








- <  
which shows that the welfare savings are generally smaller than the travel time saving. 
The reason is that, when an individual decides to stay at his work place and to trip chain 
in  order  to  economize  travel  time,  there  is  one  1 nth  of  chances  that  the  product 
purchased at the work place does not fit exactly her choice (i.e. without trip chaining, 
the individual would not shop at his workplace but elsewhere). Thus trip chaining not 
only  decreases  travel  time  but  also  decreases  the  variety  of  goods  offered.  For  the 
extreme case, where transportation costs are very high, almost all consumers will trip 
chain and the variety offered will decrease from n to 1 (and the benefit from variety will 
decrease from log(n) to 0.  
4.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
The trip chaining equilibrium in price and wages, (24), depends in a complex way on a 
number of parameters: in particular  , , ,
w d d n m m a , 
/
d d t e
a m l
- º and travel time, t. The 
following numerical exercise illustrates the effect of each of these parameters on the 
price-wage equilibrium and also on profit, consumer surplus and welfare. 
We use the simple, stylised example of an economy of one day
3. As a reference, we 
assume there are three firms offering the differentiated good. Each resident makes one 
commuting trip and one shopping trip per day, giving a total transport time of one hour. 
He also supplies 7.5 hours of labour, of which one hour is spent on the production of the 
differentiated  good.  Truck  deliveries  are  such  that  each  truck  contains  sufficient 
intermediate  good  to  produce  50  units  of  the  differentiated  good.  One  unit  of  the 
differentiated good requires an intermediate input that can be produced using 0.1 units 
of homogeneous labour. Finally, we neglect fixed costs and levies, as these do not affect 
the short-run equilibria or welfare analysis, and present gross profits per household. 
In Table 4-1 above we examine the effect on price minus wage and gross profit (π) of 
varying  the  consumers’  preference  for  work  and  shopping  locations  (
w m and
d m , 
respectively), number of shopping trips (
d a ) and travel time, for the equilibria with and 
without trip chaining. We also look at the effect of increasing the number of firms. 
When  consumers  can  trip  chain,  profits  increase  as 
w m increases  since  the  strong 
preference for  working  location means that a firm can pay  lower wages (or  charge 
higher  prices)  without  losing  workers.  Similarly,  a  weak  preference  for  shopping 
location (small
d m ) necessitates firms charging lower prices to retain shoppers. Profits 
also decrease when there are more firms due to increased competition. Similar effects 
are also seen for changes in these parameters in the no trip-chaining reference case.  
                                                       
3 This example is based on the numerical work presented in de Palma et al (2004) Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      12 
d m  
w m  
d a   n  t 






1  2  1  3  0,5  0,61  4,488  4,610  1,459  1,500  2,7  0,0 
1  5  1  3  0,5  0,61  8,923  9,110  2,938  3,000  2,1  101,3 
0,1  2  1  3  0,5  0,01  3,188  3,260  1,026  1,050  2,3  -29,7 
1  2  1  10  0,5  0,61  3,410  3,443  0,330  0,333  1,0  -77,4 
1  2  0,2  3  0,5  0,90  4,585  4,610  1,492  1,500  0,6  2,2 
1  2  2  3  0,5  0,37  4,379  4,610  1,423  1,500  5,1  -2,5 
1  2  1  3  2  0,14  4,259  4,640  1,373  1,500  8,5  -5,9 
1  2  1  3  0,25  0,78  4,543  4,605  1,479  1,500  1,4  1,4 
Table 4-1 Comparative statics with and without trip chaining 
† The difference in profit is calculated as a percentage of the symmetric case without trip chaining 
†† The difference in profit is calculated as a percentage of the reference case highlighted in the first 
row (trip chaining only) 
Interestingly, however, we see that, when consumers can work and shop at the same 
subcentre, the number of shopping trips they make (
d a ) plays a role. If consumers do 
not make frequent shopping trips then firms can make higher profits. A small value of 
d a means  that  the  travel  cost  for  shopping  trips  is  low,  which  is  equivalent  to  the 
demand curve becoming steeper. A smaller proportion of workers trip chain, so any 
decrease in price would still attract shoppers from other subcentres but these are added 
to a smaller number of trip-chaining workers. Decreasing or increasing the travel time 
from the city centre to the subcentres has the same effect on profits as does
d a . A longer 
travel  time  means  higher  travel  costs  and,  in  this  case,  a  higher  proportion  of  the 
workforce  prefers  to  trip-chain  to  minimise  these  costs.  The  demand  curve  is 
consequently flatter, since decreasing the price at one subcentre would attract customers 
from  other  subcentres  in  addition  to  the  households  that  trip  chain,  and  prices  and 
profits  are  lower.  For  the  no  trip-chaining  case,  the  price  mark-up  over  wage  does 
depend on travel time because of travel costs for the intermediate good but profits are 
independent of t. Note also that, for the trip chaining case, profit increases with l . 
It is clear from Table 4-1 that when consumers can trip chain, firms cannot make greater 
profits than when consumers can only make single purpose trips. The magnitude of the 
difference in profits obviously depends on the values of the input parameters but the 
difference is large for long travel time or high frequency of shopping trips. In Table 4-2 
we present the difference in consumer surplus and welfare (per household) between the 
two equilibria. 
As expected, the largest gains in consumer surplus and welfare with trip chaining are 
seen when consumers have a low preference for shopping location, so they are more 
likely to trip chain and firms also charge lower prices. Note that a stronger consumer 
preference for working location has no effect on welfare but decreases consumer surplus 
as firms are able to increase prices.  Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      13 
d m  
w m  
d a   n  t (hours)  λ  CS*-CSntc  W*-Wntc  W*-Wntc (%GDP) 
1  2  1  3  0,5  0,61  0,07  0,20  2,3 
1  5  1  3  0,5  0,61  0,01  0,20  2,3 
0,1  2  1  3  0,5  0,01  0,32  0,39  4,6 
1  2  1  10  0,5  0,61  0,03  0,06  0,7 
1  2  0,2  3  0,5  0,90  0,01  0,03  0,4 
1  2  2  3  0,5  0,37  0,22  0,45  5,3 
1  2  1  3  2  0,14  0,76  1,14  13,4 
1  2  1  3  0,25  0,78  0,03  0,09  1,1 
Table 4-2 Welfare effects with and without trip chaining 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
There  has  been  a  considerable  amount  of  work  undertaken  to  study  the  empirical 
aspects of trip chaining, and more generally of activity patterns. Yet, these works tend 
to focus on the consumer side, only, and therefore neglect the impacts of trip chaining 
on the quality of activity, and on the profitability of market places. We have shown that 
trip chaining has a positive impact on consumers, since on one hand the equilibrium 
price decreases and on the other hand, the average travel cost decreases. Of course, the 
variety available to the consumer decreases also since a certain number of consumers 
are  now  willing  to  economize  on  variety  (that  is,  these  consumers  are  willing  to 
purchase a good which is not the optimal one) in order to economize on travel time. 
Yes, consumers benefit from trip chaining. Of course, this shift from the optimal good 
to another good is possible only if the difference in the quality of the match between 
consumers and products is not too severe. Moreover, since market demand is constant 
and  price  decreases,  firm  profitability  decreases.  Since  prices  are  only  transfers,  as 
expected the welfare  increases with  trip  chaining. If we  consider the long-run (free 
entry)  equilibrium,  trip  chaining  decreases  profits  and  therefore  induces  exit.  As  a 
consequence,  price  increases,  and  product  variety  decreases,  two  bad  signs  on  the 
consumer side. 
Finally, we have considered a setup with constant demand. With elastic demand, trip 
chaining will induce more travellers to shop. We conjecture that trip chaining benefits 
will then be even stronger, from the social point of view.  
 Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      14 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A1:  Proof of Proposition 1. 
Recall from Lemma 1 that at the candidate equilibrium  
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s s P P - F º - . This expression is negative and single valued, so 
that there exists a one-to-one relationship between p1 and w1. Hence the set of prices is a 
convex, compact set and the equilibrium exists. Further (27) is constant, since  , t and n 
are all exogenous. 
Since a candidate equilibrium  exists,  we need only  show that  the  profit  function is 
quasi-concave to guarantee that the candidate equilibrium is the unique Nash solution. 
At any extremum 
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From (28) we can replace ( )
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From  our  model  assumptions  0 1 m < £   and  0
d m > .  Further, we  know  that, at  the 
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  is  non-negative  for 
2 n ³ . Thus (31) is non-positive. 
Substituting from (31) in (30) means that the first term on the right hand side of (30) is 
non-positive. We also know from (27) that  1
1
0 dp









 is strictly negative at any extremum (solution of the first-order 
equations) and thus the profit is quasi-concave. As a consequence, the candidate Nash 
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. QED. 
 
Appendix A2:   Proof of Proposition 3 
In the symmetric equilibrium with trip chaining, consumer surplus  per household is 
given by 
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When trip chaining is not an option, consumer surplus can be written as 
  [ ] log *
d d
ntc ntc CS n h p t m a = + - -   (33) Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      16 
(derived from 
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where 
/ 0
d d t e
a m l
- º > .  The  second  term  in  (34)  is  always  positive  for 1 n ³ .  From 
Propositions 1 and 2 we know that the mark-up is at most as large with trip chaining as 
without and, although this does not define the price levels unambiguously, we can set 
w=1 wlog in each case, leading to a non-negative price difference and hence larger 
consumer surplus. 
 
Appendix A3:  Proof of Proposition 4 
The welfare function (per household) is derived from  [ ] max ik W E U =   since profits are 
equally distributed among households (see for example Anderson and de Palma 1992). 
With  trip chaining, the expected  maximum  utility  obtained by  the  household at the 
second stage (when making shopping choices) is in fact the consumer surplus associated 
all possible shopping options given the choice of work location at the first stage in the 
nested logit tree. Welfare can then be calculated by maximising expected utility at the 
first stage, given by  
  ( ) max '
w
k k k W n E V m e   = +    (35) 
where 
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d d
h p h p t
w d
i V w t e n e
a
m m b a m
- - -  
  = X+ - - + + -
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  (36) 
is commonly known as the composite utility or expected maximum utility and contains 
terms  common  to  all  residents  who  work  at  subcentre  i  plus  the  consumer  surplus 
associated with all alternatives in the nest (in this case shopping locations given the 
choice of ith subcentre for work).  
1 (1 ) (1 ) * * ( )
h n n
T p w c t F K
N N
q b p q b a X = - + - = - + - - - - + . 
Now, (35) can be rewritten as  Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      17 
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This leads to the following expression for welfare: 
  ( ) ( ) ˆ ( ) log( )
d w d w
ntc W n n t m m a a = Y + + - +   (38) 
 where  ˆ Y is defined above. Subtracting (38) from (37) we obtain 
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The right hand side of (39) is positive for  1 n ³  and t, 
d a and
d m all greater than zero, 
which are the model assumptions we specified. Trip chaining: who wins, who loses?      18 
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